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This human rights report documents and analyzes instances in which the
Massachusetts family courts are violating internationally accepted human
rights laws and standards. The report focuses specifically on cases
involving child custody and visitation issues where there is a history of
partner abuse. In the vast majority of examples discussed in the report, the
family courts also are violating Massachusetts law and policy….Our
findings are based primarily on the in-depth testimonies of 40 battered
mothers who experienced family court litigation in 11 of the 14 counties in
Massachusetts.1
1

Carrie Cuthbert et al., BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT: A HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
AND CHILD CUSTODY IN THE MASSACHUSETTS FAMILY COURTS iv (2002) (hereinafter BATTERED MOTHERS
SPEAK OUT).
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On November 25, 2002, the Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project of the
Wellesley Centers for Women released Battered Mothers Speak Out: A Human Rights
Report on Domestic Violence and Child Custody in the Massachusetts Family Courts.
The report told the stories of forty battered mothers who had been involved in litigation
in the Massachusetts family courts and argued that these courts had violated the human
rights of battered mothers and their children.2 Specifically, the report argued that
Massachusetts’ family courts had committed
six distinct human rights violations:
I.
Failure to protect battered women and children from abuse
II.
Discrimination and bias against battered women
III.
Degrading treatment of battered women
IV.
Denial of due process to battered women
V.
Allowing the batterer to continue the abuse through the family
courts
VI.
Failure to respect the economic rights of battered women and
children.3
While battered women’s advocates applauded the study and mainstream media
outlets in Massachusetts noted that “…if only a fraction of what these women say is true,
it’s bad news for Massachusetts,”4 the official response from the court system was
discouraging.5 Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Probate and Family Courts Sean M.
Dunphy stated that the study’s “methodology is flawed,” because “the study relied on
testimony only from women with complaints about custody decisions and not from those

2

Id. at 14. To be included in the study, a woman had to: be a mother; have experienced violence from an
intimate partner with whom she had children and with whom she no longer resided; have engaged in custody
litigation with that former partner in the Massachusetts family courts; express grievances about family court
processes and/or actors and/or perceive that her human rights might have been violated by family court actors;
and be willing to speak with a documenter. Id. at 6.
3
Id.
4
Witnesses to Abuse, BOSTON GLOBE, May 9, 2002, at A-18.
5
Privately, however, some judges expressed concern about the points raised by the courts. One judge asked
one of the authors what she should do to change her court; other judges circulated “what do we do now?”
memos. Mark F. Massoud, The Influence of International Law on Local Social Movements 26 (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author).
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satisfied with rulings.”6 While Dunphy said he respected the report, he suggested that the
women’s accounts of their experiences did not justify the report’s conclusions, believing
that “the women’s testimony would have been strengthened if it were verified by
thorough review of court records and interviews with lawyers in the cases.”7
Although it initially generated a great deal of attention, the report of the Battered
Mothers’ Testimony Project did not prompt the Massachusetts family court system to
institute reforms based on its findings and recommendations.8 But why not? Why have
the stories of the forty women involved, bolstered by the accounts of advocates for
battered women and their children, failed to persuade the Massachusetts court system that
serious reform is needed to safeguard the rights, dignity, and safety of battered women
and their children?9
One possible answer to that question lies in the way in which the data collected
and relied upon by the Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project was presented—as the
narratives of battered women.10 Dunphy based his dismissal of the report on his belief

6

Rhonda Stewart, Advocates Attest to Abuse Study Findings, Call for Overhaul of Family Courts, BOSTON
GLOBE, December 5, 2002, at 1, 3. Not all of the criticisms came from women who received adverse rulings,
however. Moreover, some of the human rights violations found by the project—most notably, the degrading
treatment of battered women in the court system and the system’s permitting the batterer to continue his abuse
using the court as a forum—are not complaints about specific rulings, but about court process.
7
Patricia Wen, Report Assails Family Courts, BOSTON GLOBE, November 26, 2002, at B-2. Carrie Cuthbert, the
lead author of the report, noted that such fact checking had been done in roughly one-quarter of the cases. Id. In
all of those cases, the women’s accounts were verified. Kristen Lombardi, Custodians of Abuse, BOSTON
PHOENIX, January 9-16, 2003, ¶ 6, at http://www.bostonphoenix.com/boston/news_features/top/features/documents/02643515.htm.
8
Carrie Cuthbert et al., Battered Mothers v. U.S. Family Courts, 2 HUM. RIGHTS DIALOGUE 10, ¶ 11 (2003), at
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/printerfriendlymedia.php/prmID/1047. The report apparently prompted the court
system to engage in a self-study, however. In August 2003, the Administrative Office of the Trial Court released
Progress and Challenges: Viewpoints on the Trial Court’s Response to Domestic Violence. The report employs
a similar methodology and reaches many of the same conclusions as BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT. The
report will be discussed further infra.
9
Narratives have proven powerful forces for change in other contexts—for example, the legislative arena. See
generally Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change: The Power of the Narrative in Domestic Violence Law
Reform, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1243 (1993).
10
This is, of course, only one possible answer, although I believe a very plausible one. The authors of the report
believe that the judges were upset that the report failed to acknowledge the work that the court had done to
improve its handling of family law cases involving domestic violence—a criticism that surprised the authors,
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that the report did not constitute “good” social science (“the methodology is flawed”)
because it relied on the stories of women, and because those women’s stories did not
convince him that the courts truly had problems that needed to be addressed. By relying
on narrative, or “qualitative,” research, the Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project gave
state actors a convenient excuse for disregarding its findings—the report simply wasn’t
scientific enough to be believed.
This article challenges the assumption that narrative constitutes bad science and
argues that narratives can illuminate problems in court systems, justifying reforms. The
article begins by examining the methodology, findings and conclusions of the Battered
Mothers’ Testimony Project. The article then examines the use of narrative in social
science, human rights investigations, and the law and argues that qualitative work is
valued in all of those settings. Why, then, the unwillingness to credit the narratives of
these battered mothers? The article contends that this unwillingness to see these narrative
accounts as indicative of larger problems within the court system is tied to a tendency to
discount women’s voices, looking to both the social science and legal literature on this
topic and the gender bias studies conducted by many courts in the 1980s and 90s.11

given that “the report did include a section highlighting past achievements.” Kim Slote, Assessing the Impact of
the Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project 3 (unpublished manuscript on file with the author). Slote also believes
that people were surprised that they did not produce a typical policy paper or neutral review of the system and
sought to distance themselves from it for political reasons. Telephone interview with Kim Slote, September 29,
2004, Naples, Florida. Other possible reasons could include that the narratives came from poor women or
women of color. See text accompanying n. 156, infra.
11
The Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project grew, in part, from a study commissioned by Massachusetts’
Supreme Judicial Court in 1989 that found that gender bias in the courts was largely being ignored. Stewart,
supra note 6, at 2.
As Dorothy Roberts notes, focusing on gender as the reason for oppression “forces women of color to
fragment their experience in a way that does not reflect the reality of their lives.” Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing
Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARVARD L. REV.
1419, 1424 (1991). My choice to focus on the gendered dimensions of the response to the Battered Mothers’
Testimony Project is not meant to create such fragmentation, or to ignore the role that race likely played in the
discounting of these narratives. Indeed, BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT documents bias the mothers
experienced based on race, ethnicity, socioeconomic class, and sexual orientation. BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK
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Finally, the article asks whether the weight given to narratives about the operation
of the court system is changed by the identity of the reporter or the type of report,
comparing the effectiveness of first and third person narrative reports and qualitative and
quantitative court reports. While third person or quantitative reports may initially be
more credible to judges and decisionmakers, using such strategies denies battered women
the opportunity to tell their stories and judges the opportunity to develop empathy by
hearing them. Ultimately, silencing women’s voices in an attempt to gain widespread
acceptance further undermines attempts to reinforce women’s credibility. The
discounting of women’s voices may continue to impede projects like the Battered
Mothers’ Testimony Project from achieving meaningful change; nonetheless, collecting
and disseminating the narratives of women affected by the system should be a crucial
component of court reform.
I. The Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project
Battered Mothers Speak Out, the report of the Massachusetts Battered Mothers’
Testimony Project, was the first family court report to expose the difficulties faced by
battered mothers in the court system through a human rights lens.12 Using human rights

OUT, supra note 1, at 37-39. While the intersection of gender bias and bias based on factors other than gender is
touched on in this article, the article does not purport to thoroughly examine those issues.
12
While Massachusetts’ study was the first, it is not the only Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project in existence.
In June 2003, the Arizona Coalition Against Domestic Violence released a report entitled BATTERED MOTHERS’
TESTIMONY PROJECT: A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE. Modeled on
the Massachusetts report, the Arizona study collected the stories of 57 women to support its claim that battered
mothers involved in custody actions in the Arizona Superior Court system were being subjected to human rights
abuses. Arizona’s study reports its findings in a more traditional, qualitative way, providing statistics based on
the answers given by respondents in the study, augmented by quotes that are not linked to particular mothers and
short anonymous case descriptions.
Because the study does not primarily rely on narrative to bolster its arguments about the presence of
human rights abuses, it will not be a major focus of this article. The short stories that are relayed at various points
in the report, however, echo the stories told by the mothers in Massachusetts. See, e.g., Arizona Coalition
Against Domestic Violence, BATTERED MOTHERS’ TESTIMONY PROJECT: A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO CHILD
CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2003), at 60-61 (failure to take partner abuse seriously), 75 (denial of due
process right to be heard), 76-77 (bias against battered women). The study concludes that “domestic violence in
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norms articulated in documents like the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the report catalogued the human rights violations committed against battered
mothers by the Massachusetts family courts.13
Battered Mothers Speak Out begins by establishing the government’s
responsibility to respect, protect and fulfill the human rights of its citizens.14 In the
context of the Massachusetts family courts, respecting, protecting and fulfilling these
rights requires that courts not only “refrain from directly violating the human rights of
women and children through their actions,” but also “take positive steps to protect
children and women from abuse by non-state actors such as ex-husbands, ex-boyfriends,
and fathers.”15 “Respect” centers on the actions that the court system takes directly
through its “laws, agents, and systems”; respect includes the requirement that courts not
discriminate against battered women.16 To “protect” battered women and their children,
the Massachusetts family courts must ensure that private individuals (batterers) are not
permitted to violate women’s and children’s human rights—for example, by using the
court system to continue their abuse or by exposing women and children to danger
through unsafe visitation arrangements.17 To “fulfill” their human rights, the court
system must take active measures to ensure that battered women “have the opportunity to
obtain satisfaction of their needs (where recognized in human rights laws and
instruments) that cannot be secured by their own personal efforts.”18 Examples of
fulfilling battered women’s human rights include providing battered women with “access
Arizona is torture and…the failure of Arizona’s legal system to prevent torture places the state in noncompliance with international laws and norms that condemn torture.” Id. at 86, 87-96.
13
BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 9-11.
14
Id. at 10.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
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to shelter and the economic resources needed to flee their abusers and establish an
independent, safe life.”19 The report locates the courts’ responsibility to respect, protect,
and fulfill battered women and their children’s rights in several sources: the human
condition20, documents binding the United States as a condition of its membership in the
United Nations, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (“which defines violence
against women as a human rights violation and delineates governments’ obligations to
end and prevent it”)21, and treaties that the United States has signed but not ratified,
including United Nations conventions on the rights of children and ending discrimination
against women.22 Using this framework, the report investigated three broad questions:
Are the Massachusetts family courts respecting, protecting, and fulfilling
battered mothers’ and their children’s fundamental human rights to: bodily
integrity and freedom from violence; non-discrimination and equal protection of
the law; freedom from torture and degrading treatment; due process; freedom of
speech and a fair hearing; and adequate standard of living.
Are the Massachusetts family courts exercising due diligence with respect
to violence against women and children?
Are the Massachusetts family courts acting in children’s best interests in
child custody and visitation cases where there is a history of partner and/or child
abuse?23

The answer to all of these questions, according to Battered Mothers Speak Out, is
no. The report found that the family courts committed human rights violations in the
following areas:
I.
II.
III.
IV.

Failure to protect battered women and children from abuse
Discrimination and bias against battered women
Degrading treatment of battered women
Denial of due process to battered women

19

Id.
Id. at 10-11.
21
Id. at 11.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 11-12.
20
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V.
VI.

Allowing the batterer to continue the abuse through the family
courts
Failure to respect the economic rights of battered women and
children.24

The report examines each of these violations in turn, using the narratives of battered
mothers to bolster its findings.25
The Massachusetts family courts fail to protect battered women and children from
abuse in a number of ways, according to the report: by granting or recommending unsafe
custody and visitation to batterers; by ignoring or minimizing battered mothers’ reports of
partner and/or child abuse, failing or refusing to investigate such reports, and failing to
examine or credit documented evidence of partner and/or child abuse; and by
mishandling child sexual abuse allegations.26 The report tells the stories of Karen,
Marsha, Beth, Janice, Jane, Sonia, Gabby, and others to illustrate how the courts have
failed to protect battered women and children.27 These narratives range from quotes to
detailed case descriptions relating the women’s experiences with the courts. Karen’s
story, for example, involves a lengthy description of how both the judge and the
children’s attorney involved in her case denied her requests to curtail her former partner’s
visitation, despite evidence that he was abusing alcohol and his new wife after having
been released from jail for assaulting Karen (an assault witnessed by the older child).

24

Id. at 14.
As previously mentioned, the report relies primarily on the narratives of the forty women interviewed for the
project. The report notes, however, “[T]he BMTP received (and continues to receive) far more requests from
battered women who want to give testimony to the project than we have been able to interview and therefore
include in this report.” Id. at 28.
26
Id. at 15.
27
Id. at 15-24. In each section of the report, the narrative accounts, which are the primary source material for the
report, are supported by the observations of battered women’s advocates and followed by information derived
from interviews with state actors (who were chosen either because two or more women involved in the study had
complained about them, because they were identified as handling partner abuse and child custody issues well, or
because of their specific knowledge of various aspects of the family court system). Id. at 6-7. Not surprisingly,
“the statements that state actors made to us about their beliefs and their approaches to cases sharply contrasted
with what we had learned about how these same individuals had handled the cases we investigated.” Id. at 24.
25
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The visitation did not change until her partner was arrested for drunk driving, which
prompted the children’s attorney to remark to Karen, “I guess you’re happy now.” The
judge continued to allow Karen’s former partner unsupervised visitation.28 Karen’s story
highlights how the court system grants inappropriate visitation, ignores or minimizes
mother’s concerns about their children’s well-being, and fails to credit documented
evidence of partner abuse.29
Sonia begged the judge and guardian ad litem in her case to look at police reports
documenting her ex-partner’s violence towards his new partner. She remembered,
When we went into court and when Michael was looking for sole custody, I told
[the judge] that I felt that Luke was in a violent home and was in danger of being
harmed, and [the judge] wouldn’t have anything to do with it. He wouldn’t listen
to me. I had documents there that I wanted to show him but he refused to look at
them…[A] few weeks later, [he] gave Michael sole legal and physical custody of
Luke.30
Their inability to make themselves heard in the court system was devastating for
these mothers. As Marsha explained, “I don’t think there is a worse thing in the world
than not being able to protect your children. Like someone’s got my hands tied behind
my back and I’m watching them beaten up, and I can’t protect them.”31 Using the stories
of Karen and her counterparts, the report argues that the courts are ignoring the
international human rights laws and standards requiring them to protect battered women
and their children from further abuse.32

28

Id. at 15-16. Given the criticism that the report was invalid because of its reliance on the women’s subjective
retellings of their experiences, it is noteworthy that a representative from the Battered Mothers’ Testimony
Project was present at two of Karen’s hearings to confirm her recollections and her impressions. Id. at 16.
29
Cassie’s example of how court actors minimized reports of partner abuse is more direct: “In my first meeting
with the guardian ad litem, I had told him that there was a significant history of domestic violence, [that] my expartner had been to [a batterer’s intervention program] and that I was disabled as a result of the abuse, and he
told me, “No one cares about that abuse crap.” Id. at 19.
30
Id. at 22.
31
Id. at 16.
32
Id. at 27. The report contends that the courts’ failures constitute violations of the rights to be free from
violence, torture, and degrading treatment, the right to non-discrimination, and the government’s obligations to
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Similar stories illustrate the report’s other major conclusions. Sandy described
the gender bias she faced when trying to explain her partner’s history of domestic
violence against her to a guardian ad litem.33 The guardian ad litem, for example,
despite documents from the emergency room detailing her injuries as a result of one
assault, and a judge’s findings that Sandy’s reports of abuse were credible, told Sandy
that depending on where her bruises were, he might deem her the offender.34 Lorie
explained how state actors’ failure to understand the effects of abuse colored their
assessments of the parties’ parenting abilities.
The [guardian ad litem] was saying [that I] was psychologically unstable and, you
know, irrational, emotional, and angry. It’s like, yeah, if you’ve been through 10
years of what I’ve been through….You go through hell and try to get out of hell
and they punish you, saying, “Oh, you cry too much and you’re upset, so you
know, the kids are more stable with the father, there’s no emotion.35
Lorie further detailed degrading treatment by judges, a custody evaluator, and a guardian
ad litem.36
Fran was denied due process at hearings by a judge who refused to allow her to
speak in court and by a probation officer who circumvented court orders.37 Most of the
women described how their batterers were permitted to continue their abuse using the
court system; Sonia’s story was typical. “He’s forced me to go back to court endlessly. I
exercise due diligence and to act in children’s best interests, as articulated in international treaties. Id. at 15, 2728. The courts’ failures also constitute violations of United States and Massachusetts law. Id. at 29-30.
33
Id. at 33.
34
Id. Other forms of bias documented by the report include biased investigations, evaluations and reports;
holding battered mothers to higher standards of parenting and behavior than fathers; stereotyping women as
hysterical and unreasonable; and discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity, socioeconomic class, and
sexual orientation. Id. at 33-39.
35
Id. at 36.
36
Id. at 46. Lorie described judges who did not let her speak at hearings, did not pay attention to the testimony
of her witnesses, and seemed to be almost sleeping during trial. Id. Other denials of due process included
pressure to engage in mediation or other forms of alternative dispute resolution; denial of access to guardian ad
litem reports, and ethical issues, including conflicts of interest and misrepresentations, that operated to deny due
process.
37
Id. at 50. The probation officer permitted Fran’s ex-husband to attend private therapy with a counselor with no
expertise in domestic violence in lieu of participating in batterer’s intervention counseling; general therapy is not
an appropriate substitute for a batterer’s intervention program.
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can’t remember how many motions we have on our docket. There’s got to be 150. Every
time I turned around for years, there was another piece of paper coming in the mail from
the courts.”38 Marsha described how the courts permitted her ex-husband to deprive her
and her children of their economic rights, both through decisions on child support and by
permitting her ex-husband to litigate baseless custody challenges, leaving Marsha and her
children “scraping by.…All of her savings have gone to lawyers.”39 June recalled, “I
remember my son having a 103-degree fever one night and having to get to the
pediatrician, and I didn’t have a dime on me ‘cause he wasn’t paying any child
support.”40 All of the actions described by these women, according to the report, violated
international human rights laws and norms and Massachusetts standards, and in some
cases, United States law.
Given the numerous human rights violations documented by the Battered
Mothers’ Testimony Project, the report concludes with a call for Massachusetts to “take
positive steps to remedy the human rights violations against battered mothers and their
children….”41 Such steps include increased training for state actors on partner and child
abuse; a reform of the guardian ad litem system; increased economic and legal resources
for battered mothers and their children; and the creation of a system to hold the family
courts accountable for their actions.42 While the authors believe that their findings are

38

Id. at 59. In addition to being permitted to file multiple harassing or retaliatory motions, batterers were
allowed to continue their abuse via the court system by making false allegations against their victims;
manipulating the court process to avoid or reduce their child support; and using parallel actions in courts with
different jurisdictions to gain advantage. Id. at 59-62.
39
Id. at 65. Women’s and children’s economic rights are jeopardized by the cost of family court litigation,
family court actions (like requiring battered women to pay visitation supervisors or guardian ad litems required
because of their partners’ abusive behavior), courts’ willingness to allow batterers to use the courts to drain their
victims, missing work or losing jobs as a result of court dates, and their ability to find affordable, competent
representation (needed both to secure their economic rights and to oppose baseless litigation). Id. at 66-69.
40
Id. at 68.
41
Id. at 74.
42
Id. at 73.
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sufficient to create an understanding of the problems faced by battered mothers and their
children in family court litigation, establish human rights abuses, and propose
recommendations for change, they caution that they make “no claim regarding statistical
significance, ability to generalize to a larger population, or the overall extent of the
reported problems either in Massachusetts or elsewhere.”43
Battered Mothers Speak Out presents a compelling picture of battered women and
their children denied justice by a court system that ignores their needs, treats them with
disdain, and is generally insensitive to their plight. Or, Battered Mothers Speak Out
presents nothing more than the subjective perceptions of a disgruntled handful of the
thousands of litigants who engage with the Massachusetts family court system each year.
In large part, the way that the study’s findings are interpreted depends on the reader’s
willingness to accept the first person narratives of forty individual battered mothers44 as a
sufficient basis for concluding that the Massachusetts family courts are violating battered
mothers’ human rights. Even the study itself is ambivalent on this point, drawing
conclusions and making recommendations pertaining to the Massachusetts family court
system as a whole while warning that the study “does not purport to represent all battered
mothers who have experienced litigation in the Massachusetts family court system” and
“makes no claim regarding…ability to generalize to a larger population.”45 Ultimately,
the persuasiveness of Battered Mothers Speak Out is directly tied to its use of the
narratives of battered women, a characteristic cited as a strength by the researchers but
dismissed by state actors. The next section of this article examines the value placed on
43

Id. at 8.
Case reviews were conducted by researchers in about one quarter of the cases, but which cases were verified
is not clear from the report.
45
BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 8. Note, however, that stories were collected from battered
mothers in 11 of Massachusetts’ 14 counties, making it somewhat easier to make statewide claims. Id. at 6.
44
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narrative research in the social science, human rights and legal communities. Given the
willingness of all of the relevant communities to credit narrative research, the section
concludes that the identity of the storytellers—battered mothers—rather than the use of
the narrative form is what caused Battered Mothers Speak Out to be largely ignored.
II.

The Value of Narrative

Chief Judge Dunphy suggested in his comments at the time of publication that the
methodology employed in Battered Mothers Speak Out was “flawed,” leading him and
other state actors to disregard the study’s findings. In the section entitled “Project
Documentation and Research Strategies,” the authors of Battered Mothers Speak Out
describe their methodology as combining human rights fact finding with qualitative and
quantitative social science research methods. They address their decision to rely
primarily on narratives in the report, explaining,
The goal of human rights fact-finding is to identify human rights violations as
reported by the victims of the violations and those who witnessed them….As in
human rights fact-finding, the driving force behind qualitative research is the
prominence of the voices of the people under study (project participants).
Qualitative research methodology is especially strong in enabling researchers to
document the lived experiences of individuals and to give participants the
opportunity to describe, in their own words, the social, cultural, and political
phenomena affecting them.46

Was this decision to rely primarily on narrative methodologically valid given the
current state of thinking in the fields of social science, human rights documentation and
law? The next sections address this question.
A. Quantitative and Qualitative Investigation in Social Science Research
1. The False Dichotomy
46

Id. at 5. Note that the project also used quantitative research methods to collect “sociodemographic
information and event data about participants’ lives during a specified period of time related to the abusive
relationship with an intimate partner and subsequent litigation in the family courts.” Id.
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“Valid” social science research is frequently equated with “quantitative”
research—at the most basic level, research that relies on numbers, rather than words (the
province of qualitative research).47 While quantitative research was the “dominant”
approach of social scientists in the United States for many years, “since the 1960s there
has been a revival in the fortunes of qualitative types of research in these disciplines, to
the point where their legitimacy is widely accepted.”48 Nonetheless, social scientists
continue to battle the perception that qualitative research is not as scientifically rigorous
or objective as quantitative, which has implications for the use of such research in
developing social policy.49
To flesh the differences between the two out a little more fully, quantitative
research “implies the application of a measurement or numerical approach to the nature
of the issue under scrutiny as well as to the gathering and analysis of data,” while
qualitative research
relies upon case studies or evidence gleaned from individuals or particular
situations…[and] explores the processes behind observed associations between
factors, charts individual outcomes and explores the meanings and contexts of
individuals’ behaviour. Thus, quantitative and qualitative approaches differ not
only in the methods employed but also in the perception of the problem and the
type of data they produce.50

47

Martyn Hammersley, Deconstructing the qualitative-quantitative divide, in MIXING METHODS: QUALITATIVE
41 (Julia Brannen, ed. 1992) (citation omitted). Hammersley suggests that the real
issue between the two schools of thought is precision, with quantitative researchers arguing that sufficient
precision can be achieved only through quantification. Hammersley cautions, however, that precision can be
expressed in ways other than numerically, and that accuracy is more important than precision, particularly when
numbers are used to “imply a greater degree of precision than their likely accuracy warrants.” Id. at 42.
48
Id. at 40.
49
Roger Bullock, Michael Little & Spencer Millham, The relationships between quantitative and qualitative
approaches in social policy research, in MIXING METHODS: QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH, id. at
89; see also Julia Brannen, Combining qualitative and quantitative approaches: an overview, in MIXING
METHODS: QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH,, id. at 18; Virginia L. Olesen, Feminisms and Qualitative
Research At and Into the Millenium, in HANDBOOK OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna
S. Lincoln, eds. 2000), at 217.
50
Bullock, Little & Millham, id. at 85; see also Ruthellen Josselson & Amia Lieblich, A Framework for
Narrative Research Proposals in Psychology, in UP CLOSE AND PERSONAL: THEN TEACHING AND LEARNING OF
NARRATIVE RESEARCH (Ruthellen Josselson, Amia Lieblich & Dan P. McAdams, eds. 2003), at 260; Herbert J.

AND QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH
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Quantitative research provides social scientists with “authoritative survey
data…assess[ing] the incidence, epidemiology and boundaries of problems of the
situation under scrutiny.”51 Qualitative research, in contrast, provides “greater
understanding of the meaning and context of behaviours and the processes that take place
within observed patterns of interrelated factors” and enables researchers to examine the
perceptions different participants have of the same situation.52
Although researchers stress that best practice frequently requires that both
quantitative and qualitative methods be used to study a problem,53 the type of problem
being studied generally dictates which type of research strategy should take the lead in a
given project. For example, in a study of parents caring for young adults with mental
handicaps and behavior problems, the researcher explains, “The problem area itself was
socially defined and therefore might be differently constructed by different actors, and its
more severe manifestations were known to be likely to be distressing to those involved.
This suggested that there would be value in a qualitative approach.”54 Because it “blurs
easily into advocacy and efforts to find solutions to problems,”55 qualitative research is
also well-suited to addressing “flaws and faults in society and in so doing promote
actions that eliminate problems.”56
2. Narrative Research as a Subset of Qualitative Research

Rubin & Irene S. Rubin, QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWING: THE ART OF HEARING DATA 32 (1995) (describing the
“positivist” or quantitative model of research).
51
Bullock, Little & Millham, id.
52
Id. at 86.
53
See, e.g., id. at 86-87.
54
Hazel Qureshi, Integrating methods in applied research in social policy: a case study of carers, in MIXING
METHODS: QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH, id. at 120. The similarities between the factors used to
determine that qualitative research was appropriate in this case and the challenges posed by research on battered
mothers will be examined in Part IIID., infra.
55
Rubin & Rubin, supra note 49, at 13.
56
Id. at 35.
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Narrative research, like the type used by Battered Mothers Speak Out, is one form
of qualitative research, an approach that often seems “heretical to those reared in a
positivistic, scientistic atmosphere.”57 Narrative researchers contend that experiences
have little value unconnected to the stories told by the participants, because stories are the
means by which we understand and relate those experiences.58 Narrative research
distinguishes itself both from the methods and the goals of quantitative research by
stressing an examination of a subject’s life experiences and the connection of those
experiences to historical, social and cultural contexts.59 Narrative analysis, then, has two
goals: to understand how people and/or groups make sense of their experiences and to
describe the social worlds they inhabit and social resources “they draw on, resist and
transform as they tell their stories.”60 Narratives are not simply offered in a vacuum, but
rather used to construct theory.61
Narrative researchers reject the assertion that neutrality is either desirable or
achievable in social science research. While students are trained to think of research in
terms of “objectivity” and “truth,” lacking in “personal connection and passion,”
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Introduction, in UP CLOSE AND PERSONAL, supra note 49, at 4. As June Price notes, however, “The very act of
posing a research question will influence and shape the answer,” regardless of whether the method used to
answer the question is quantitative or qualitative. June Price, In Acknowledgment: A Review and Critique of
Qualitative Research Texts, in MAKING MEANING OF NARRATIVES 2 (Ruthellen Josselson & Amia Lieblich, eds.
1999).
58
Guy A.M. Widdershoven, The Story of Life: Hermenuetic Perspectives on the Relationship Between Narrative
and Life History, in THE NARRATIVE STUDY OF LIVES (Ruthellen Josselson & Amia Lieblich, eds. 1993), at 7.
59
Colette Daiute & Michelle Fine, Researchers as Protagonists in Teaching and Learning Qualitative Research,
in UP CLOSE AND PERSONAL, supra note 49, at 62-63. The editors of UP CLOSE AND PERSONAL: THE TEACHING
AND LEARNING OF NARRATIVE RESEARCH describe the differences: “In considering people as constructors of
their experience, such research takes a giant step away from parsing human experience into predefined
‘variables’ and requires of the researcher an equally major shift in perspective and approach. Rather than
forming hypotheses, the researcher frames questions for exploration; in place of measurement are the challenges
of deeply listening to others; and instead of statistics are the ambiguities of thoughtful analysis of texts.”
Introduction, id. at 3.
60
Susan E. Chase, Learning to Listen: Narrative Principles in a Qualitative Research Methods Course, in UP
CLOSE AND PERSONAL, supra note 49, at 80-81.
61
Blythe McVicker Clinchy, An Epistemological Approach to the Teaching of Narrative Research, in UP CLOSE
AND PERSONAL, supra note 49, at 46.
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narrative researchers claim that research is always affected by the researcher’s “goals,
plans, beliefs and practices.”62 The relationships developed between subjects and
researchers using narrative research methodology help those researchers to better
understand their own biases, assumptions and social reactions63, allowing narrative
researchers to be more honest about the operation of these factors on their research than
quantitative researchers, who maintain (erroneously, according to narrative researchers)
that their numerical methods protect them from the influence of such factors. In fact,
some narrative researchers maintain, “Neutrality is probably not a legitimate goal in
qualitative research,” both because it is impossible to achieve and because it impedes the
development of the empathetic connection between researcher and subject needed to
elicit personal stories and probe for details.64 Despite these connections, however,
narrative researchers argue that their results can be as generalizable as those attained in
quantitative research—more so, if the questions being asked require more than simple
“yes or no, approve or disapprove” responses.65
3. Battered Mothers Speak Out in the Context of Social Science Research
The main criticism leveled against Battered Mothers Speak Out involves its use of
the narratives of battered women to support its assertion that these women’s human rights
62

Daiute & Fine, supra note 58, at 64. They explain that “social research is always constructed and contingent,
that no construct or life or community preexists language or social relations; that research is about evidence,
framing and reframing.” Id. at 65.
63
Annie G. Rogers, Qualitative Research in Psychology: Teaching an Interpretive Process, in UP CLOSE AND
PERSONAL, supra note 49, at 55.
64
Rubin & Rubin, supra note 49, at 13. The authors caution, however, that balance is necessary; “too much
sympathy can…be blinding.” Id.
65
Id. at 72-73. Narrative researchers have questioned whether the use of such standards is appropriate for
evaluating their work. Traditionally, “reliability, validity, objectivity, and replicability” were considered the
prime criteria for evaluating research. Narrative researchers have suggested, however, that these criteria are
inappropriate for evaluating their work, and in fact, are contradictory to the narrative approach. They suggest,
instead, that the following criteria be used to evaluate their research: width, or the comprehensiveness of the
evidence; coherence (how the parts create a complete and meaningful picture); insightfulness (innovation or
originality in presentation and analysis); and parsimony (providing analysis based on a small number of
concepts). Amia Lieblich, Rivka Tuval-Mashiach & Tamar Zilber, NARRATIVE RESEARCH: READING, ANALYSIS
AND INTERPRETATION 173 (1998).
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were violated. The use of such narratives is entirely appropriate in social science
research, particularly when, as in Battered Mothers Speak Out , those narratives are
supported by other kinds of information, including interviews and surveys of other actors
within the system, case reviews, and external documentation of abuse.66 The procedure
followed by the interviews conformed to social science research principles as well:
trained interviewers used a semi-structured instrument to conduct the interviews, which
were later transcribed and analyzed using practices accepted in the field.67
Battered Mothers Speak Out acknowledges the limitations of its research. As the
authors note in a companion study, “It is important that these data be recognized as
documentation of a set of issues based on reports of affected individuals (i.e. battered
women referred to the project based on their dissatisfaction with family court outcomes
or processes) rather than an attempt at definitive research into the prevalence and nature
of the types of cases discussed.”68 In fact, the authors suggest, Battered Mothers Speak
Out provides a starting point for future quantitative research into the scope of the
problems it identifies, the long-term implications of custody and visitation decisions on
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Sixteen state actors, including seven family court judges and four guardians ad litem were interviewed. Most
of these state actors were contacted because of complaints against them. BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra
note 1, at 7-8. Thirty-one advocates for battered women and children completed surveys consisting of nineteen
open-ended questions. Id. at 6-7. As previously noted, case reviews were conducted in about one quarter of the
battered mothers’ cases to verify their claims. See Wen, supra note 6, at B-2. All of the participants had some
form of documentation of the violence they had experienced. Jay G. Silverman, Cynthia M. Mesh, Carrie V.
Cuthbert, Kim Slote & Lundy Bancroft, Child Custody Determinations in Cases Involving Intimate Partner
Violence: a Human Rights Analysis, 6 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 951, 952 (2004).
67
“Interview transcripts were read initially to identify emerging themes. Coding schema were then developed
to define and identify particular problems faced by participants; schema were modified to reflect new
understanding of emerging patterns throughout the coding process. Interrater reliability was verified through
secondary review of all coded passages. Coded data were managed with a customized relational Microsoft
Access 2000 database….Frequency of defined problems among transcripts was assessed, and human rights
violations implicated were identified.” Silverman et. al., id.; see also BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra
note 1, at 8. The project staff included social science researchers as well as lawyers and experts on domestic
violence. Slote interview, supra note 10.
68
Id. at 956. In fact, while in the footnotes the report quantifies the number of women reporting a particular
problem, it does not use those “statistics” to argue that any percentage of the family court population is
experiencing similar problems. BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 8.
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children in cases involving domestic violence, and the utility of the various solutions for
improving the court suggested by the report.69
One particularly pointed criticism that deserves greater attention is the argument
that the failure to incorporate competing narratives (those of the alleged perpetrators,
lawyers, judges and/or guardians ad litem involved in the cases of the women
interviewed) renders the women’s stories unbelievable. While the request for this
information seems reasonable on its face, in fact, it creates a circular argument through
which the battered women’s narratives are silenced. The critics seek external validation
of the battered women’s claims from the very persons identified as having committed the
abuse,70 or having been biased, or having discounted evidence of domestic violence
presented to them—all of whom bring their own experiences, perspectives and biases to
the stories they tell. When, predictably, the actors in question deny these claims, the
critics at best will throw up their hands and say, “The evidence is in equipoise,” and at
worst, will use these stories to drown out those told by battered women—the very
phenomenon the mothers describe in the report. While some of the battered mothers’
claims are externally verifiable using means other than alternate narratives—for example,
by quantifying the frequency with which custody is awarded to those alleged or found to
have committed domestic violence or inappropriate referrals to mediation are made—
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Id. Using qualitative evidence to produce hypotheses that can be tested using quantitative methods, as
suggested by the authors, is an accepted social science research practice. Bullock, Little & Millham, supra note
48, at 87. The Boston Globe called for such a review after hearing only a portion of the evidence amassed by the
researchers. Witnesses to Abuse, supra note 4, at A-18 (“A full report on this project will be issued in October.
But state officials should act now. A systematic review of court cases involving domestic violence and custody
could reveal ways to improve policies and procedures.”)
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Note, too, that the purpose of the project was not to prove whether the women were battered or not, but to
gauge their treatment by the courts and other state actors when they claimed that they had been battered. As the
authors note, “Because the main focus of this work was accountability of the government rather than of abusive
partners, documentation and descriptions of abuse suffered by participating women and their children provide a
context for examining actions or inactions of family court state actors as possible human rights violations….”
Silverman et al., supra note 66, at 952.
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others are about the process itself and cannot be verified using case reviews or other
external measures. This is particularly true in those cases where those with whom you
would check such claims have their own reasons for insisting that the system is fair.71 No
record would exist, for example, of Karen72 or Lorie’s73 out-of-court conversations with
the guardians ad litem representing their children, and the guardians ad litem are
unlikely to verify claims that cast them in an unprofessional light.
Moreover, asking for external validation on these types of unverifiable claims
misses the point of the report. The relevant inquiry here is not how many battered
mothers received poor treatment on a number of dimensions at the hands of state actors.
Instead, the question being asked is how and why battered mothers perceived that they
were being mistreated by the family court system.74 Only the narratives of the battered
mothers involved with the system can answer that question.
The battered mothers’ narratives are used to understand their individual stories as
well as to examine the context in which those stories are being told—the family court
system. Qualitative research generally, and narrative research specifically, are accepted
and acceptable methods of exploring, reporting, contextualizing and generalizing the
experiences of discrete populations, like the women studied in Battered Mothers Speak
Out. The methodology used by the project allows for generalization, but the project
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As Anthony Amsterdam explains, “I suppose each one of us sees pretty much what his or her own head is
screwed on to see….” Anthony G. Amsterdam, Telling Stories and Stories About Them, 1 CLIN. L. REV. 9, 19
(1994).
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See text accompanying note 28-29, supra.
73
See text accompanying note 34, supra.
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Ensuring that the public perceives the court system as fair should be a major concern for the court. See Robert
J. Aalberts, Thomas Boyt & Lorne H. Seidman, Public Defender’s Conundrum: Signaling Professionalism and
Quality in Absence of Price, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 525, 527 (2002) (arguing that “[i]f the American people lose
confidence in the court system, its role in protecting legal rights and creating meaningful and effective public
policy could be greatly undermined.”)
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makes no claims of quantitative statistical significance, and in fact, uses the narratives
generated to suggest both policy changes and future research.
B. Narrative Evidence in Human Rights Investigations
1. Narratives and Human Rights Investigations
Human rights investigations have long been used throughout the world to
document state abuses of power resulting in violations of international law. The use of
human rights investigation is a less common method of documenting domestic human
rights violations, however.75 As Judge Dunphy opined, human rights investigations “may
work well for systems in Third World countries, but not for a court in the United
States.”76 But a growing number of organizations, particularly those working on behalf
of women in the United States, are using international human rights norms to analyze the
actions of domestic institutions.77 The Ford Foundation report Something Inside So
Strong provides several justifications for the use of domestic human rights
documentation:
Documenting human rights violations can be a powerful way to make the abuses
faced by your community visible and credible, and can help to expose and challenge the
perpetrators of the abuse. By collecting information about human rights violations in
your community, it is possible to introduce a human rights perspective to your work,
while empowering community members to speak for themselves in confronting human
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Some have argued that the reluctance to employ these techniques is related to “a deliberate, long
- standing
effort by the federal government to deny the legitimacy of human rights and, in particular, their application to
situations internal to the United States.” Eunice Cho et. al., SOMETHING INSIDE SO STRONG: A RESOURCE GUIDE
ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2002).
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Lombardi, supra note 7, at ¶ 6.
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See, e.g.,Molly Beutz et. al., THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST REFUGEE AND
IMMIGRANT WOMEN IN THE MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL AREA: A HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (2004); Cho et.al., supra
note 75, at 40; Shruti Rana, Restricting the Rights of Poor Mothers: An International Human Rights Critique of
Workfare, 33 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 393 (2000); see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Transnational Law as a
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“International human rights treaties, human rights documents, and international and comparative legal norms are
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rights abuses. Documentation of abuse also provides a quantifiable, yet human face to a
situation, providing a tool for further action.78
The authors of Battered Mothers Speak Out echoed these themes in an article
written after the report was released. The human rights framework allowed the authors
“to demonstrate the linkages and overlap between the violations, the economic issues
battered mothers face after separation, and the multiple forms of discrimination many
battered women experience.”79 Additionally, the human rights framework helped
battered women see their own experiences in a broader rights-based context and
highlighted the severity of the abuses they alleged.80
Collecting the stories of those alleging human rights abuses is a cornerstone of
this work. “It is through individual complaints that human rights are given concrete
meaning….When applied to a person’s real-life situation, the standards contained in
international human rights treaties find their most direct application.”81 The narratives of
victims are an essential, perhaps the most important, component of a human rights
investigation.82 As the authors of Battered Mothers Speak Out note,
[H]uman rights documentation’s central source of information is first-hand
testimonies of the survivors of such violations. Typically, these are the very
voices that are muted or silenced by the government and society. In human rights
documentation, survivor accounts are corroborated by witnesses, fact-checking,
secondary research, and interviews with state actors. Still, survivors’ voices
remain paramount to the process of investigation.83
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Cho, id. at 48; see also WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS STEP BY STEP 111 (Margaret A. Schuler & Dorothy Q.
Thomas eds. 1997) (offering rationales for creating “national human rights systems”).
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Cuthbert et al., supra note 8, at ¶ 7.
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Id. at ¶ 8.
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Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 7/Rev.1, Complaint Procedures 2 at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs7.htm.
82
Schuler & Thomas, supra note 78, at 147.
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Kim Slote et al., Battered Mothers Speak Out: Participatory Human Rights Documentation as a Model for
Research and Activism in the U.S. 13-14 (unpublished report on file with the author).
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Human rights organizations, from non-governmental organizations like Human
Rights Watch and Amnesty International to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, collect the stories of individuals in order to document claims of human
rights abuses throughout the world. Investigations into human rights claims of battered
refugee and immigrant women in Minneapolis/St. Paul,84 women raped during the war in
the former Yugoslavia85, Afghani women86, Nigerian victims of war crimes87 and
countless others have been supported by the testimony of the affected individuals. The
narratives contained in Battered Mothers Speak Out fall squarely within this tradition.
How should such narratives be compiled? In Women’s Human Rights Step by
Step, Margaret Schuler and Dorothy Thomas provide a blueprint for conducting a human
rights investigation. They separate the process into three steps: preparation,
fieldwork/investigation, and follow-up and analysis.88 In their discussion of
fieldwork/investigations, Schuler and Thomas explain that while “the type of evidence to
be gathered depends on the investigation’s objectives,”89 collecting narratives is crucial.
They state, “Whatever the investigation’s objective, the testimony of the victims of the
abuse is very important.”90 Such testimony should be detailed and can be supplemented
by the testimony of others with first-hand knowledge of the abuse being studied as well
as secondary information from other sources.91 Evidence should be collected from all
sides to “assure[] balance and impartiality and provide[] a more thorough representation
84

See generally Beutz et al., supra note 77.
International Human Rights Law Group, No Justice, No Peace: Accountability for Rape and Gender-Based
Violence in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. J. 89 (1994).
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Sonali Kolhatkar, The Impact of U.S. Intervention on Afghan Women’s Rights, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L. J. 12
(2002).
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of what occurred.”92 Because “[t]he value of the evidence depends on its accuracy,
reliability, and specificity,” investigators should also seek to corroborate what they have
learned through direct testimony; methods of corroboration include interviewing other
witnesses or collecting similar complaints from other sources.93
2.

Battered Mothers Speak Out as Human Rights Investigation

While critics of Battered Mothers Speak Out doubted whether the use of human
rights investigation was an appropriate framework for addressing a domestic issue, no
one questioned whether the authors of the study followed an established process for
collecting narratives in such an investigation. The human rights community generally
seems to agree that collecting the stories of victims is an acceptable, even essential,
component of building a human rights documentation case; the value of those narratives
as justification for policy change does not seem to spark the same academic debates as in
the social science and legal worlds. The process for collecting such narratives seems
fairly uncontroversial as well; in fact, little has been written about how human rights
documentation should be conducted (as opposed to why).94
The authors of Battered Mothers Speak Out adhered to the general principles set
forth by Schuler and Thomas in Women’s Human Rights Step by Step. They collected
the stories of victims and made those stories the focal point of their investigation.95 They
supplemented the stories with accounts of other first hand witnesses—advocates for
battered women and their children.96 Researchers also interviewed state actors, many of
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Id. at 147.
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International human rights lawyers I contacted saw the collection of victim stories as such a given in human
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whom disagreed with the victims about the way in which the Massachusetts family courts
operated; 97 including these perspectives allowed researchers to provide a more balanced
account. Researchers sought to corroborate the victims’ stories through the use of
secondary documentation.98
The Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project has been recognized as a model for
conducting domestic human rights investigations. In its publication Something Inside So
Strong: A Resource Guide on Human Rights in the United States, the Ford Foundation
calls the Project a “case in point” for conducting human rights documentation in the
United States.99
C. Narratives and the Law
1. The Role of Narratives in Legal Scholarship
While lawyers are, fundamentally, storytellers100, until recently legal scholarship
did not embrace the use of narratives.101 But as scholars examining issues of race102,
gender103, poverty104, and sexual orientation105 have increasingly come to rely on their
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own stories, as well as the stories of clients and others, in their scholarship, a
conversation about the worth of narrative legal scholarship has emerged.
Narratives in legal scholarship describe the experience of individuals and groups
with the legal system and provide context for these experiences.106 Using narratives in
legal scholarship is appealing, in part, because it mirrors what lawyers do.107 Proponents
of narrative legal scholarship also stress how narratives bring the voices of those
traditionally deprived of power within the legal system to the forefront.108 Arguing that
while it may appear neutral, the law itself is a story, structured around narratives
developed by the powerful, proponents of narrative theory offer alternative narratives to
illustrate the ways that the law excludes these voices and advocate for the need to reform
the law to address “outsider” voices.109 Narratives help to create common ground,
allowing individuals to understand and empathize with the experiences of individuals and
groups who are, or seem, different.110 Narratives can bridge the gap between the
abstractions of the law and the individual experiences of the humans involved in legal
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proceedings.111 As in social science, narratives permit feminist scholars to challenge “the
jurisprudential insistence on a fictional abstract discourse of objectivity and
reasonableness” resulting from the imposition of these “masculine” values as the norm.112
Even critics of the use of narrative agree that narratives featuring these “stories from the
bottom” have an important role to play in legal scholarship.113
2. Evaluating Legal Narratives
Critics of narrative scholarship have noted a number of concerns about this type
of work: that the stories told by narrative scholars lack normative legal content; are not
persuasive; are not trustworthy; are not typical; and curtail further discussion.114 Even if
the narratives are sufficiently “valid,” an additional concern arises about the quality of the
scholarship itself.115 Each of these concerns will be addressed in turn.116
Some critics contend that narratives lack normative legal content. This argument
is generally framed in one of two ways: either the narrative fails to “shed…even
descriptive light on a particular legal problem” or implicate a legal rule or the narrative
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does not “contribute to the formulation of a legal response” to the legal issue or problem
identified in the narrative.117 This concern about normative legal content is tied to the
question of whether the narrative is (or can be) sufficiently persuasive to justify
challenging or changing existing norms.118 The persuasiveness of a narrative is, in turn,
affected by whether the narrative is perceived as true, as typical, and can create
understanding in a listener who has not shared the experience.
For Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry, discovering and communicating “truths”
about the legal system is the function of legal scholarship.119 While narratives are an
integral part of the legal system, critics note that the “truth” derived from competing
narratives is generally established through the adversarial process.120 Without a judicial
declaration of “truth,” critics argue, the credibility of the narrative must be accepted on
faith, a difficult task for readers whose experiences do not resonate with those described
by the author.121 A skeptical reader’s credulity may be further tested by the emotional
content of some narratives; the discomfort of sharing personal revelations may lead
readers to “discount, discredit, or otherwise distance themselves from such
discussions.”122 Moreover, relying on readers to determine whether a story is truthful or
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not is problematic, argue the critics, given that social science research indicates that
humans are poor judges of truthfulness.123
Even if a narrative is truthful, the critics contend, it should not serve as the basis
for policy change unless it is also typical. One person’s experience should not serve as
the basis for change that affects many, many others, the argument goes, unless the
experience related in the narrative is common to a significant number of others.124
Determining typicality can be as challenging as ascertaining truth; “people are too quick
to assume the presence of a pattern from a small number of cases.”125
Finally, narrative scholarship must be good scholarship. Simply telling an
evocative story is insufficient to constitute quality legal scholarship As with social
science research, that story must be tied to some kind of analysis to assure the reader both
that the story is “credible and representative” and to place the story in the context of the
wider legal debate with which the story is concerned.126 As Farber and Sherry explain,
“A legal story without analysis is much like a judicial opinion with ‘Findings of Fact’ but
no ‘Conclusions of Law.’”127
3. Battered Mothers Speak Out as Legal Narrative
Determining whether Battered Mothers Speak Out constitutes sound legal
scholarship according to the standards set forth by critics of narrative legal scholarship
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depends on the answers to the questions posed above. Do the narratives have normative
legal content? Are they persuasive? Trustworthy? Typical? Analytical? Each of these
questions is considered below.
Normative legal content refers both to the narrative’s ability to highlight a legal
problem and to suggest a legal solution to that problem. Certainly Battered Mothers
Speak Out meets both of those objectives. The report highlights the range of negative
experiences battered mothers had with the family courts of Massachusetts128 and suggests
ways that family court personnel, judges, probation officers, guardians ad litem and
others with roles in the functioning of the family court could address these problems.129
While the changes recommended relate to process, rather than doctrine, they nonetheless
require a legal system response and therefore have normative legal content.130
Are the narratives contained in Battered Mothers Speak Out persuasive and
trustworthy? These are harder questions to answer, partly because few have weighed in
on these questions, and partly because answering the questions requires deciding whose
observations to accept. The narratives seemed to resonate with the Boston Globe,131 as
well as with battered women’s advocates throughout the country; the project has been or
is being replicated in a number of other states.132 Battered mothers identified with the
stories, calling lead author Carrie Cuthbert to tell her, “This is my story. Your project
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made me feel like I’m not alone.”133 Fathers’ rights, groups, however, disagreed,
describing the report as “one-sided.”134 The court, too, tacitly challenged the veracity of
the reports by suggesting the need for external validation of the claims.135 Very little
other documentation sharing perceptions of the narratives exists.136 It is likely that most
of the readers of the report were people with a stake in the debate, and their views are
represented in the comments above.
Kathryn Abrams argues that individuals can determine the validity of narratives
based on a number of factors.
[I]f I read the particularized accounts of each, and if I find that they have an
acceptable degree of internal consistency, create a plausible account of a particular set of
events, and do not seem suspicious in tone, I begin to have a belief that is not based on
my own experience….I believe [narratives], in other words, in the same way and for
many of the same reasons that I would believe an effective witness in a courtroom.137
But, Farber and Sherry contend, those standards (although largely the same as
those relied upon by the Supreme Court) are not themselves trustworthy enough to
employ.138
Ultimately, the problem with using the standards of persuasiveness and
trustworthiness to evaluate narrative legal scholarship is that they are largely
unattainable. The different life experiences, preferences and biases that color narratives
also color responses to narratives. As a result, few narratives will create the kind of
consensus around persuasiveness and trustworthiness that critics of narrative scholarship
133
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would require, especially when those narratives involve subjects as emotional and hotly
contested as domestic violence and child custody. It seems unreasonable, then, to judge
the validity of the narratives found in Battered Mothers Speak Out by these standards.
Are these narratives typical? Farber and Sherry stress that “typicality is unrelated
to any commitment to ‘objectivity’ as a philosophical position. Instead, we are merely
asking, ‘If we checked with more people in the same situation, how many of them would
tell similar stories?’”139 The difficulty with this standard is defining the phrase “people in
the same situation.” The responses from other battered mothers and advocates for
battered women strongly suggest that these narratives are typical, so long as “other
people in the same situation” is defined as “other battered mothers in the family court
system.” If the definition is “other mothers in the family court system” or “other
individuals in the family court system,” the answers would obviously be very different.
Again, the subjectivity of the inquiry makes determining whether the standard has been
attained almost impossible.
Battered Mothers Speak Out does contain the kind of analysis Farber and Sherry
deem necessary for narrative scholarship to be “good” scholarship. The report ties the
issues raised by the battered mothers in their narratives to provisions in international,
federal, and state law and argues that state actors have violated these international norms
and United States and Massachusetts laws in the cases of these forty women. Whether
the reader agrees with the argument is not dispositive under Farber and Sherry’s schema;
the report provides the type of rigorous legal analysis—the conclusions of law to
accompany the findings of fact—required for quality narrative legal scholarship.
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Battered Mothers Speak Out falls squarely within the tradition of using narratives
to make change in social science research, human rights investigation, and the law. The
stories very clearly illustrate how the legal and human rights of the forty women
interviewed were violated by the actions and inactions of various state actors.140 The fact
that narratives were used to illuminate the problems in the Massachusetts family courts
should not have precluded state actors from crediting its allegations.
The problem with these narratives is not that they are the stories of individuals.
Instead, their credibility is compromised by who is telling the stories—battered women.
Women’s voices have historically been discounted by the legal system, and battered
women are particularly suspect. The next section looks at the legacy of silenced women
and gender bias in the courts to argue that the storytellers, not the stories themselves,
were what kept Battered Mothers Speak Out from achieving the kind of policy change it
should have prompted.
III.

Narrative and Gender

The effectiveness of Battered Mothers Speak Out as an impetus for court change
depends largely on whether the narratives of the forty battered mothers it contains are
believed. The willingness to believe these stories is tied to assumptions about the
credibility of women’s testimony. This section asks whether the women’s stories—
particularly battered women’s stories—are generally deemed credible by judges and other
state actors, or, alternatively, whether women face an uphill battle in having their stories
believed. Social science research and legal scholarship on the credibility of women,
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reinforced by reports studying gender bias in the courts in the 1980s and 90s, suggests
that the latter is true.
A. Devaluing Women’s Stories
For women’s stories to be believed, they must first be heard. Elizabeth Schneider,
building on the work of Carol Gilligan, has suggested that being heard is a two-step
process. Schneider explains, “The first stage is to recognize women’s different voice, or
voices, and to make it possible for these voices to be heard. The second stage is to
recognize all the ways women’s voices can be heard and yet not really heard—to identify
what I call the complexities of voice.”141 While Schneider believes that women’s voices
are beginning to be incorporated into American law, those voices nonetheless “may not
really be heard” for a number of reasons.142 Listeners may find it difficult to sort through
the plurality of women’s voices, as there is no singular “women’s voice.”143 Moreover,
the stories that battered women tell are stories of violence, from which men “disconnect”
and women “dissociate”; “both responses might be understood as forms of denial.”144
Gender bias further muffles the voices of women in the legal system. Bias against
women continues to pervade American society145; the legal system is no exception.
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“That women have voluntarily engaged law at all is a triumph of determination
over experience. It has not been an act of faith.”146 Bias against women has long been an
issue for courts, in part because women operate in a legal system developed by men, for
men.147 While women involved with the courts are devalued148 in any number of ways,
one crucial manifestation of this bias is the tendency of legal system actors to doubt
women’s credibility.149 Studies of jurors reveal the belief that women are “less rational,
less trustworthy, and more likely to exaggerate than men.”150 These doubts about
credibility stem from the prevailing consensus of how a credible witness sounds: “like a
man.”151 Judges may even require more evidence from women than men to prove the

146

Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L. J. 1281, 1284 (1991).
As Catherine MacKinnon notes, “No woman had a voice in the design of the legal institutions that rule the
social order under which women, as well as men, live. Nor was the condition of women taken into account or
the interest of women as a sex represented.” MacKinnon, id. at 1281; see also Christy Gleason, Presence,
Perspectives and Power: Gender and the Rationale Differences in the Debate Over the Violence Against Women
Act, 23 WOMEN’S RIGHTS L. REP. 1, 9 (2001) (describing the judiciary as “an institution steeped in male tradition
and dominated by male perspectives on the bench and in chambers….”); Regina Graycar, The Gender of
Judgments: Some Reflections on “Bias,” 32 UNIV. OF BRITISH COLUMBIA L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) (arguing that “If
there is only an issue of ‘gender’ when something is done by or pertains to women (and not when it is
overwhelmingly done by men) and ‘bias’ connotes deviation from a norm that is never articulated, but is in fact a
white, male norm, then a case can be made for the proposition that judging is, or is perceived as, a white male
activity.”); Schneider, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING, supra note 141, at 104-05.
148
Martha Chamallas describes devaluing as “bias that may or may not be legally prohibited.” Martha
Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L.
REV. 747, 756 (2001). Devaluing “operates to fix a ‘gender’ or ‘race’ to a neutral activity or category and
simultaneously to place it on a hierarchy of value”—for example, women’s credibility or women’s testimony.
Id. at 772. One notable feature of devaluation is that it is “masked,” making it difficult to determine whether it is
operating within the system. Id. at 775.
149
Lynn Hecht Schafran suggests that there are three forms of credibility: collective credibility, or credibility
resulting from membership in a group; contextual credibility, or credibility which depends on an understanding
of the context of the claim; and consequential credibility, being taken seriously and having harms done to you
taken seriously. Schafran argues that women lack all three forms of credibility in the legal system. Lynn Hecht
Schafran, Credibility in the Courts: Why Is There a Gender Gap?, in SUBTLE SEXISM: CURRENT PRACTICE AND
PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE 216-225 (Nijole Benokraitis ed. 199?); see also Kathy Mack, Continuing Barriers to
Women’s Credibility: A Feminist Perspective on the Proof Process, 4 CRIM. L. FORUM 327, 332 (1993).
150
Linell A. Letendre, Beating Again and Again and Again: Why Washington Needs a New Rule of Evidence
Admitting Prior Acts of Domestic Violence, 75 WASH. L. REV. 973, 981 (2000).
151
Women are more likely to exhibit speech features associated with powerlessness (high pitch, frequent
smiling, less numerical specificity) and speak hesitantly, even if certain, while men are more likely to use more
numerical specificity less accurately and to speak confidently even if unsure or wrong. Judges may be more
likely to ascribe blame to a person using a powerless speech style. Mack, supra note 149, at 330-31.
147

35

same claims.152 Questions about women’s truthfulness have been long been raised in the
context of rape and sexual assault153; such doubts now surface in cases where women
allege other forms of injury, like sexual harassment or sex-based discrimination.154 The
wishes expressed by women in right-to-die cases are routinely discounted, while those of
men are respected.155 The stories of women of color have been subject to especially
harsh scrutiny.156 So have the stories of battered women.
Battered mothers confront the same skepticism about their credibility as other
women, but their testimony is further shadowed by myths and stereotypes about victims
of domestic violence.157 Because stories about domestic violence “often appear to judges

152

Karen Czapanskiy, Gender Bias in the Courts: Social Change Strategies, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 5 (1990)
(citing Maryland’s gender bias study).
153
See, e.g., Martha F. Davis et al., Brief of Petitioner: Brzonkala v. Morrison; U.S. v. Morrison, 9 S. CAL. REV.
L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 315, 334-35 (2000) (describing how judges and other state actors subject rape victims to
excessive scrutiny, casting doubt on their credibility) (citations omitted); Jan Jordan, Beyond Belief? Police, rape
and women’s credibility, 4 CRIM. JUSTICE 29, 30-31 (discussing how women’s credibility is doubted by police
and judges in rape cases); see generally Mack, supra note 149, at 332-36. These questions persist even in the
absence of studies confirming that women lie about rape more frequently that other victims lie about other
crimes. See State v. Guenther, 2004 N.J. LEXIS 941, 55 (N.J. Sup. Ct. August 9, 2004); Susan Estrich, Palm
Beach Stories, 11 LAW & PHIL. 5, 13 (1992).
154
The Honorable Diane Wood explained why who makes credibility determinations is important, stating, “[A]ll
cases begin with a story: a story told by the potential plaintiff about something that happened to her that she
believes violated her legal rights. Who hears these stories? Who believes them? What difference does it make if
someone thinks they are plausible or not? On what will the listener draw in making that crucial initial
determination?….Who created that law, which I remind you must be followed under the principles of stare
decesis? In a word, men. Now you well might ask—indeed, you have an obligation to ask—why that should
make any difference….[T]here is still an experiential gap between the finest man and the average woman when it
comes to sex discrimination. [This gap] has an impact on a trial judge’s assessment of a record….” Judge Wood
concludes that “these stories are still falling on deaf, or partially deaf, ears.” Diane P. Wood, Sex Discrimination
in Life and Law, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 1, 4-6 (1999).
155
National Conference of State Trial Judges, THE JUDGE’S BOOK 110 (citing study on decisionmaking in rightto-die cases where no living will exists). The Judge’s Book concludes about the findings of that study, “In other
words, men are rational, independent beings whose moral agency must be respected even when they become
incompetent, but women are only children.” Id.
156
See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Gender, Race, and the Politics of Supreme Court Appointments: The Import of
the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas Hearings: Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1467,
1470 (describing how perceptions of black women’s chastity affect their credibility); National Conference of
State Trial Judges, supra note 155, at 113 (discussing bias against black victims of domestic violence); Maria L.
Ontiveros, Rosa Lopez, David Letterman, Christopher Darden, and Me: Issues of Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in
Evaluating Witness Credibility, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 135 (examining how the failure to understand class,
race, and gender issues affected determinations of a witness’s credibility).
157
Studies show that “jurors construct stories based on the evidence presented and the jurors’ own life
experiences….jurors may ‘fill in the blanks’ of the story, consciously or unconsciously, based on their own life
experiences….Thus, if jurors accept the commonly held myths about domestic violence and the defense further
reinforces these misconceptions at trial, they may ‘fill in the blanks’ with an unrealistic view of the violent

36

as problems relating to personality flaws, relationships gone bad, anger and jealousy,”
and therefore as deviations by both parties from the standards of acceptable behavior
between intimate partners, judges can more easily discount the credibility of the women
telling the stories.158 Battered women frequently respond to violence in ways that are
suspect to those who place their faith in the legal system: refusing to turn to police and
courts159, delaying the telling of their stories, minimizing or underestimating harms, and
revising stories as they recover from the abuse.160 Moreover, judges who lack experience
with domestic violence may rely on courthouse assumptions about the dubious legitimacy
of such claims and the pretextual reasons women have for filing them.161 Judges question
the ulterior motives of women bringing domestic violence claims—“they are often
considered manipulators and liars intent on using the court to achieve some wrongful
purpose, such as revenge or advantage in a divorce case”—further calling their credibility
into doubt.162
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Battered Mothers Speak Out documents how state actors question the truthfulness
of battered mothers’ allegations of abuse in the context of custody decisionmaking.163
The report’s finding that actors in the Massachusetts family courts believe that women
fabricate claims of abuse is consistent with other discussions on the perceived credibility
of battered women. In fact, judges are often skeptical—and encouraged to be skeptical-of battered women’s claims164, particularly when custody is at issue. As Martha Fineman
notes in her discussion of the National Interdisciplinary Colloquium on Child Custody’s
Legal and Mental Health Perspectives on Child Custody Law: A Deskbook for Judges,

[T]he Deskbook for judges appears to anticipate that disbelief is to be not only
expected but also encouraged as the initial judicial response. The Deskbook’s
chapter on domestic violence devotes an entire section (one out of only five in
total) to credibility. Titled “Problems of Proof; Determining Credibility,” the
section begins with the statement of “common knowledge that, for a variety of
reasons, psychological as well as familial, determining the truth when allegations
of domestic violence emerge is a difficult business.”165
The Deskbook admonishes judges not to allow abusive spouses to offer excuses
for their conduct, but also instructs them to take a “similarly firm stance” against parents
who complain of “common (if hardly exemplary) behavior” or who make false claims of
abuse.166 Fineman asks, “What are judges to make of this series of statements,
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particularly since actual violence is equated with exaggeration and misrepresentation of
violence for purposes of provoking judicial wrath?”167 Fineman concludes,
The Deskbook suggests that judges look for collaboration from other credible
witnesses or police reports or else reasons why a woman did not complain earlier.
The inference is that many women are likely to lie or exaggerate about the men
with whom they find themselves entangled within the legal system….The
commentary and approach of the Deskbook is couched in the belief that men need
protection from the lies of women, who are vindictive and unscrupulous and who
will say and do anything at the expense of their children.168
Encouraging judges and other state actors to be skeptical of claims of domestic
violence creates a Catch-22 for a battered mother: if she doesn’t raise the issue, the court
has no context for considering her actions and her reluctance to permit unsupervised
visitation or share custody with her former partner. If she discloses the abuse, the
attitudes of judges and others make it “highly unusual for a battered mother in private
litigation to be recognized by a court to be sincerely advocating for her children’s safety.
Rather, her very status as a litigant, a mother, and battered, seems to ensure that she will
be viewed as, at best, merely self-interested, and at worst, not credible.”169 Given the
skepticism with which judges approach individual litigants’ claims of domestic violence,
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it is hardly surprising that the collective stories in Battered Mothers Speak Out were
dismissed by the Massachusetts judges.
B. Gender Bias170 Studies
Gender bias lurks in the shadows of the legal landscape confronting battered
mothers. The limited acknowledgment of the existence of gender bias in the courts is
directly attributable to the work of the gender bias task forces formed in thirty-nine states
and a number of federal circuits in the 1980s and 90s.171 Not surprisingly, one of the
major findings of the gender bias task forces was “that state court systems are seriously
compromised by gender bias, and most frequently and dramatically, the victims are
women”172—particularly battered women. Jeanette Swent summarizes the reports as
follows: “Women receive unfavorable substantive outcomes in cases because of their
gender, and men do not. Women’s complaints are trivialized and their circumstances
misconstrued more often than men’s, and women more often than men are victims of
demeaning and openly hostile behavior in court proceedings.”173
Both the federal and state task forces found that the credibility of women litigants
was regularly questioned.174 In the Ninth Circuit, questions about women’s credibility
arose in the context of Social Security disability cases. Both male and female claimant
representatives reported that women’s disability claims were less likely to be believed
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than men’s.175 Women’s claims were more often seen as “complaints about life” than
“legally cognizable harms.” 176 New York’s task force stated, “Judges, attorneys and
court personnel do not give as much credibility to women as to men, and perceive women
as acting differently from men.”177 Missouri and Georgia’s task forces acknowledged the
body of social science literature suggesting that women are perceived as less credible;
Missouri’s report notes that male and female attorneys disagreed as to whether judges
found male witnesses more credible than females.178
Some state reports specifically addressed credibility in the context of domestic
violence cases. Karen Czapanskiy notes that although every gender bias study found
women litigants were treated as less credible than men, “[t]he problem seems particularly
acute when the issue is a woman’s accusation that a man has been violent toward her.”179
Jeannette Swent’s analysis of the gender bias task force reports suggests that a victim of
domestic violence may “find…her toughest adversary on the judicial bench.”180 In
Virginia, “female family law attorneys, female prosecutors and those who provide
services to victims of family abuse believe that judges do not know enough about the
dynamics of family abuse” and minimize the claims of victims both in the context of
protection order and custody cases.181 Missouri’s report documented both how victims of
175
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domestic violence felt the merits of their claims were ignored. These victims felt
disbelieved, blamed and belittled by the questions asked by judges and the perception of
other system actors that women were misusing the protective order process to “harass
men or to obtain an advantage in domestic relations proceedings,” despite the absence of
any evidence to support that contention.182 Missouri’s report admonishes, “Concern for
system abuse should not cause judges to overlook the fact that, in a violent relationship,
the filing of a divorce action can trigger additional violence.”183 In Maryland, the task
force heard how a judge’s inability to connect his own experience to that of a battered
woman led him to deny the woman a protective order despite her allegation that her
husband had threatened her with a gun:
[The judge] took a few minutes to decide on the matter and he looked at me and
he said, “I don’t believe anything that you’re saying…The reason I don’t believe
it is because I don’t believe that anything like this could happen to
me….Therefore, since I would not let that happen to me, I can’t believe that it
happened to you.184
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Responses to the gender bias task forces were mixed. The studies made some
professionals uncomfortable and others angry. As the Ninth Circuit’s Task Force on
Gender Bias noted,
Many men and women share a feeling that these issues are close, and
sometimes too close for comfort. While much of our other work at some level
implicates one personally, questions of gender are so plainly about ourselves,
about the construction of our lives and our relationships, that the protective veneer
of professionalism often fades. In practical terms, this proximity translates into a
reticence, a nervousness, and sometimes even a hostility to approaching the issues
raised here.185
When Karen Czapanskiy presented her study of the gender bias task forces, “a number of
the comments fell into two categories: I don’t believe you because your numbers are
inconsistent with my experience, or I don’t believe you because your experience is
inconsistent with what I think the numbers are.”186
Some of the comments, however, hinged on the methodology that the studies had
used to reach their conclusions of widespread gender bias in the courts. The task forces
used a variety of methods to collect data on gender bias187; collecting the narratives of
those who had experienced gender bias (mainly women) was one of the primary methods
used.188 Hearing the women’s stories helped task force members to understand the
challenges women faced in engaging the courts and enhanced the credibility of the
185
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victims.189 And while “a particular story might be unverifiable, masses of consistent
testimony gathered from a variety of sources and using various research methods
persuaded members that gender bias did infect the courts.”190 The task forces debated
how to present their findings. Early task forces worried that their conclusions and
recommendations could not be sufficiently bolstered by the stories of women alleging
gender bias; later task forces relied more heavily on the voices of those who testified to
give their reports “life” and “passion.”191 Such attention to information gathering
techniques and presentation did not impress everyone, however. Applauding a decision
to deny further federal funding to gender bias studies, Senator Orrin Hatch called the
studies “ill-conceived, deeply flawed and divisive…methodologically biased and
flawed”192—ironically, the same charges leveled against Battered Mothers Speak Out.
Massachusetts’ task force made findings similar to those of other states. The
Gender Bias Study Committee “found gender bias to be in operation when decisions
made or actions taken were based on preconceived or stereotypical notions about the
nature, role or capacity of men and women. We observed the effect of myths and
misconceptions about the economic and social realities of men’s and women’s lives and
about the relative value of their work.”193 Specifically, the study found that “female
litigants…are faced with unnecessary and unacceptable obstacles that can be explained
only in terms of their gender.”194 Such gender-biased treatment of female litigants
“undermines credibility and confidence and thereby places unwarranted burdens” on
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them.195 The gender bias in the Massachusetts courts “weaken[s] female litigants’
testimony. When women…are denied credibility because of their gender, the courts are
seriously impaired in their ability to deliver justice to anyone in our society.”196 The
issue of credibility was of particular concern in the context of domestic violence. The
Gender Bias Study Committee explained, “The tendency to doubt the testimony of
domestic violence victims and to ‘blame’ them for their predicament not only hampers
the court’s ability to provide victims with the protection they deserve, it also has a
chilling effect on victims’ willingness to seek relief.”197 A sizeable number of judges
believed that female victims were deemed less credible in cases of domestic violence and
sexual assault.198 The Committee found that victims were asked what they had done to
deserve the abuse, why they were seeking protection in the absence of physical injuries,
why they waited to seek relief from the courts, and why they were bothering the courts
with their problems.199 The study also found that judges and family service officers were
not adequately considering violence against women in making custody decisions200, and
that a majority of judges believed that “mothers allege child sexual abuse to gain a
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bargaining advantage in the divorce process.”201 The study made a number of
recommendations to address these findings of bias against women in the Massachusetts
courts.
The Massachusetts Committee for Gender Equality, charged with implementing
the task force recommendations, created a widely praised eight-page brochure containing
rules for avoiding gender bias. But as Jeannette Swent notes, the simplicity of the
product “is also its downfall. While the pamphlet may reduce the number of ‘honey’
stories, it will not produce meaningful insight into how gender bias works. Neither will it
discourage anything more subtle than a pat on the fanny in open court.”202 The stories of
the women in Battered Mothers Speak Out bear out Swent’s prediction.
While some progress has been made since the gender bias task force reports were
issued, a follow-up study in Maryland revealed that “no group perceives gender…bias as
non-existent or even close to non-existent….Gender problems persist in the treatment of
domestic violence victims and the application of laws.”203 Battered Mothers Speak Out
verifies that the gender bias identified by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
1990 continues to exist in Massachusetts as well, particularly for battered mothers
seeking custody of their children. In the face of gender bias, questions about women’s
credibility, and the legacy of skepticism about battered women’s claims, it is hardly
surprising that the narratives contained in the report failed to sway state actors in
Massachusetts. Given the difficulties in making battered women’s stories audible to
decisionmakers, should the authors of Battered Mothers Speak Out have chosen a
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different method to document the human rights abuses they found? The next section
considers that question.
V. Who (or What) Should Tell the Story?
The credibility of women, particularly battered women, in the courts is so
compromised that using the narratives of battered women to convince state actors that
change in the courts is needed may be a futile endeavor. How, then, can those seeking
change convince those in power that change is needed? Should battered women’s stories
be told in the third person, rather than the first? Should the experiences of battered
women be conveyed by statistics, rather than words? Both of those approaches are
considered below.
A. Third Person Narratives: Court Watch
One method that investigators working on Battered Mothers Speak Out used to
verify the claims of their subjects was to attend hearings with the battered mothers and
document what they saw and heard. Volunteers and professionals in a number of states
have performed similar services through court monitoring projects. Court monitoring, or
court watch, programs “help the system reach its potential by identifying flaws,
recommending solutions, and advocating for change” based on the cases that court
monitors observe.204 Court watch programs also help communities enhance their
understanding of the court process. As one court watch participant explains,
The courts exist on behalf of the community, but the community is not educated
enough to know what is going on, nor are they in a position to be able to tell the courts
what they think they ought to be doing….[O]ur calling is to be able to bring back to the
204
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community as a whole, anecdotal information; here is what is happening in the courts,
these are the kinds of sentences that people are getting, this is the way judges are treating
victims, this is the way judges are treating perpetrators.205
When state actors are skeptical about reports coming from those who use the courts, “a
‘court watch’ program may provide the necessary documentation of dubious behavior”
and provide judges with an impetus to change their ways.206 Court watch programs can
also help to dispel myths about the way litigants use the court process.207
Judges are acutely aware of the scrutiny of those who report on the proceedings in
their courtrooms.208 In one infamous Maryland domestic violence case, the judge noted
that “because no one was present from the victim’s family or a victim’s advocacy group,
he could sentence ‘in anonymity.’”209 He also alluded to the influence that Mothers
Against Drunk Driving has had in pressuring judges to sentence drunk drivers
severely.210 His comments imply that had someone been watching him when he
considered the case of a man who pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter for shooting his
wife in the head with a hunting rifle after finding her with another man, the sentence
might have been more severe than eighteen months of work release and fifty hours of
community service.211 The judge might also have refrained from referring to the man as
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a “noncriminal” and speculating that most married men would have inflicted some
“corporal punishment” in that situation.212 After a group of grandmothers in Alaska sat
in court for a few days to watch a judge handling domestic violence cases, the judge
asked the women what they wanted; they told him exactly what he needed to do
differently to comply with state law. Within six months, the court had changed its
practices, a change the women reinforced with occasional return visits.213
Why might the results reported from court watch programs be more credible than
the first person narratives of the women who use court systems? Court watch programs
use “objective” volunteers who have no stake in the proceedings214, although many
participate specifically because they have concerns about how justice is being
administered.215 Court watchers may be able to articulate concerns about the treatment of
battered women, concerns which, coming from battered women, would be easy to
dismiss as self-serving.216 The reports of court watchers are imbued with a credibility
that first person accounts from battered women seem to lack, answering the claims of
bias leveled at the narratives battered mothers tell of their interactions with the family
court system.
B. “Objective” Reports on Family Courts
212

Id.
Buel, supra note 206, at 739-40.
214
A study of Bergen County, New Jersey’s Court Watch II raised concerns about “solicitousness on the part of
the judges….However, monitors did express confidence in their ability to remain objective and generate valid
findings.” Bergen County Commission on the Status of Women, supra note 204, at 90.
215
One court watch organization focusing its efforts on cases involving violence against children and women
describes its volunteers as follows: “WATCH volunteers are civic-minded people who come from a wide variety
of backgrounds,” who are “motivated by their concern for the safety and welfare of abused and neglected
children in our community….” Rebecca Kutty, WATCH’s Monitoring of Open CHIPS Cases in Hennepin
County Juvenile Court 1 (2001). In Richmond, Virginia, one defense attorney noted a concern that a court watch
program was “really an advocacy group in disguise,” noting the large red buttons reading “Safe at Home” that
court watch volunteers wear in the courtroom. Akin, supra note 208, at A-1.
216
WATCH documented how a victim seeking a protective order was interrogated about why she remained
with her batterer, while the batterer was largely ignored. Kutty, id. at ch.6. If the victim had articulated her
discomfort with these questions, she might easily have been told that the questions were appropriate, and her
concerns about the judge’s demeanor—and its effect on her--dismissed.
213

49

Conveying the experiences of battered mothers through numbers rather than
words is another option. Although quantitative research is subject to some of the same
criticisms about objectivity and bias as qualitative research, policymakers and state actors
nonetheless might accept statistical information about problems with the court process
that they refuse to hear when conveyed in narrative form.
A recent study of the Philadelphia family courts supports this hypothesis. Justice
in the Domestic Relations Division of Philadelphia Family Court: A Report to the
Community details the challenges faced by families who seek the assistance of the
Philadelphia Family Court to address their family crises. The study, written by
Philadelphia’s Women’s Law Project (WLP), was created in response to the numerous
accounts received by the Project “from women who have had difficulties navigating the
domestic relations judicial process and negative experiences trying to present their
cases.”217
The Women’s Law Project’s report is self-consciously quantitative; as they began
their work, “we recognized the necessity of using objective standards to guide both the
collection and evaluation of the information about the Court.”218 The central component
of this quantitative study was a court observation project. The WLP developed two
survey instruments, one for use in custody cases and one for protection from abuse cases
and “developed the forms to be neutral and objective, particularly because our other
sources of information were more subjective in nature.”219 Using those tools, volunteers
collected data in various courtrooms; the data was later entered into a computer system
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and analyzed for reliability by testing the correlations between the reports of primary and
secondary observers.220 The courtroom reports were supplemented by the narrative
accounts of volunteer telephone counselors and courtroom observers, surveys of callers to
the Women’s Law Project Telephone Counseling Service, test calls to the Customer
Service Unit of the Domestic Relations Division and a review of court materials.221
While the Women’s Law Project collected the narratives of individual litigants using a
variety of tools, that information was generally presented in collective, numerical form.
The “experience” of using the Domestic Relations Division is presented “from the
consumer’s perspective,”222 but not in the consumers’ own words.
The reception the Philadelphia report received could not have been more different
than the response to Battered Mothers Speak Out. Although the report found a number of
pervasive problems with the Domestic Relations Division that threatened the quality of
justice afforded litigants, and questioned whether, given “[t]he prevalence of women as
petitioners in family law matters…gender bias contributes to the Court’s low prestige and
insufficient resources,”223 there was no public outcry. Instead, “[t]he domestic relations
division issued a written thanks to the WLP after the report was released”224 and the
Board of Governors of the Philadelphia Bar Association adopted a resolution detailing
the report’s findings and pledging its support to “improving the delivery of justice in the
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Domestic Relations Division….”225 The study also spurred Supreme Court Justice
Sandra Newman to seek a new building for the Domestic Relations Division.226
What accounts for this difference? While it could be any number of different
factors, the depersonalization of the information provided in the report is one possibility
to consider. Instead of confronting the court with the names and first person accounts of
aggrieved women, the Philadelphia report offers numbers and statistics to reach a
conclusion remarkably similar to the one reached in Battered Mothers Speak Out. Opting
for a quantitative report may have made those conclusions easier to hear and spurred the
local legal establishment to action to relieve the conditions documented in the report.227
A California group working on its own Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project certainly
seems to share that belief. Instead of soliciting the stories of affected women, the
California Protective Parents Association is randomly reviewing 270 files in custody
cases involving domestic violence for its replication of the Battered Mothers’ Testimony
Project. Researcher Linda Bernard explains, “We wanted to avoid the methodological
criticisms of projects such as the [Massachusetts] BMTP and others that it’s a biased
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sample….”228 The California project is committed, however, to maintaining the human
rights focus.229
C. Why Are Narratives So Important?
Given the obstacles created by the use of narratives, and the existence of other
ways of presenting evidence in support of court reform, why should advocates continue
to collect and disseminate the narratives of those affected by problems with the family
courts?
Collecting narratives, particularly in the context of a human rights investigation,
gives battered women an opportunity to share their experiences and have their stories
validated. As one BMTP participant explained, “Just to have someone believe my story
literally saved my life.”230
Using narratives to highlight systemic problems can give courts and state actors
the opportunity to develop empathetic understanding of the problems faced by litigants in
the family court. Hearing narratives helped Maryland’s legislators to understand the
problems confronted by battered women seeking protective orders and led directly to
reform of the state’s domestic violence laws. Jane Murphy describes the impact of the
women’s testimony:
Ultimately, this is a story about domestic violence victims and their advocates,
who forced decision-makers to listen after decades of inattention to the problem.
They listened, not only to the experts, and not only to the statistical and fiscal
impact testimony-they listened to the stories of the women and children who have
been devastated by the legal system's historical tolerance of violence in the
home.231
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Courts and state actors can distance themselves from problems described by
numbers or impartial observers far more easily than they can from the individual
accounts of experiences in their courtrooms.232
Finally, abandoning the use of narratives in favor of more “objective” evidence
tacitly accepts the premise that women are not credible, and in so doing, further
undermines women’s credibility. Because we believe that courts and state actors won’t
believe women’s stories, we choose not to tell them. By making that choice, we deprive
those entities of the chance to examine or to change their opinions about women’s
credibility. We can never hope to change the perception that battered women are not
credible if we stop offering those who we seek to persuade an opportunity to see these
women in a different light.
VI. Conclusion
Over two years have passed since Battered Mothers Speak Out was first issued
and little has changed in the Massachusetts family courts. The work of the Battered
Mothers’ Testimony Project has been slowed by a lack of funding. And yet, week after
week, battered mothers call the project to tell their stories: stories of discrimination,
humiliation and (the Project would argue) human rights abuses perpetrated by judges and
other state actors in the Massachusetts family court system. If only judges could hear
these stories—without the pretext of “junk science” or the blinders of gender bias—
perhaps the family courts could better protect the battered women and children who seek
their assistance.
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This analysis begs the question of whether judges really care about the problems articulated by those using the
system. Is satisfaction of litigants part of their mission? Are other issues more important to the judges? Mark
Massoud’s study of the Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project suggests that even as they publicly dismissed the
mothers’ claims, the judges did care about the issues raised by the report. Massoud, supra note 5, at 29.
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